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Foreword: Is Civil Rights Law Dead?
John Valery White"
A HYPOTHETICAL:
A man walks into your office seeking representation. He has just
been released from prison, cleared, by DNA testing, ofa crime he did
not commit. He tells you that when he first heard of DNA testing he
knew he would finally prove he was wrongly convicted. You are
suspicious of his legal claims from the start. His conviction would
have been reviewed on direct appeal and probably via state and
perhaps federal habeas proceedings. But he tells you something that
catches your ear. He recounts how some ten years ago he requested
DNA testing and was told flatly, "No." You are outraged but not
really shocked. You understand that this is not necessarily the basis
for a legal claim; DNA testing is an expensive technique that might
be refused to someone who had been duly convicted and whose
conviction had been repeatedly upheld. But when he says his family
and attorney at the time had been able to put together sufficient funds
to finance the testing at discounted rates graciously offered by a
recognized forensic laboratory, you start to believe there might be
something here. Weeks of preliminary research and a review of
several court transcripts reveals a shocking circumstance: DNA
testing had been denied to this man for no reason at all-simply
refused. You think, this man has been denied reasonable access to the
very evidence used to convict him. The prosecutor did not offer any
of the reasons that might implicate the state's interest-limited
material for testing,' minimal probative value to be derived from
testing,2 tests of similar accuracy having already been done,' or the
Copyright 2003, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.

J. Dawson Gasquet Memorial Associate Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert
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1. In United States v. Price, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22292 at *28-38 (E.D.
Okla. 1999), rev'd.on othergrounds,United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811 (10th
Cir. 2000), early DNA tests conducted by federal officials consumed all of the
material gathered at the scene of a crime, making independent testing by an alleged
co-conspirator impossible. The district court admitted the DNA tests over the
alleged co-conspirator's objections. See also United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d
1380, 1387-88 (3rd Cir. 1991) (upholding rejection of Bradyclaim based on nonmalicious destruction of a biological sample collected from crime scene making
DNA tests impossible).
2. Courts have widely denied testing where the testing will not prove the
plaintiff's innocence. These denials have involved testing impossibilities-where
there were multiple assailants, for example, each depositing biological material and
*

610

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63

plaintiff's failure to request testing at the appropriate time.4 Rather,
they defend their refusal on no reason at all. The upshot is that the
man, now your client (you fool!), endured an additional, needless
decade in prison for a crime he did not commit.
You think: dream case! This is just what civil rights law is
designed to address: unjustified abuses ofpower by state officials that
cause injury to individual citizens-you are thinking Monroe v.
making exclusion of the defendant impossible with current tests-or proof
limitations-i.e. the evidence of guilt at trial is of a quantity and quality that DNA
tests will not be expected to demonstrate innocence. See, e.g., Mebne v. State, 902
P.2d 494, 497 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting request for post-conviction DNA
testing, saying testing would be appropriate where (1) there was single perpetrator,
or (2) the person was convicted with "weak" evidence that might be overcome by
DNA tests).
In Peoplev. Ghulston, 697 N.E.2d 375, 378-80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), a typical
testing impossibility case, an Illinois court rejected petitioner's request for DNA
testing because the presence ofmultiple assailants depositing genetic material meant
DNA tests would not prove actual innocence. The Gholston court nevertheless
recognized a due process right to evidence: "[W]e recognize that due process
requires that no person convicted of a crime should be deprived of life or liberty
given compelling evidence of actual innocence ....

DNA testing may yield

conclusive information as to the actual innocence of a wrongly accused criminal
defendant." Id. at 421-22. See alsoYoung v. State, 746 N.E.2d 920,923-24 (Ind.
2001) (upholding denial oftesting at trial because tests would not produce reliable
evidence); but see State v. Frazier, 1995 Del. Super. Ct. LEXIS 474 (No.
30805884DI) (Super. Ct.Del., New Castle, Aug., 3, 1995) (state financed DNA was
not required because, among other things, plaintiff had confessed to crime in
question, and remote likelihood that DNA tests would add to abundant evidence of
his guilt).
3. CompareUnited States v. Price, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22292 (inability
to conduct independent DNA tests because first test consumed sample did not bar
admission of first tests' results).
4. Courts have denied DNA testing where testing was possible at the trial and
the defendant did not request either testing or access to evidence for testing. This
class of cases involves situations where the defendant argues that the prosecutors
or police should have conducted tests on their own initiative prior to or immediately
after arrest. See Harrison v. Abraham, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 6894 (No. 96-4262)
(E.D. Pa. 1997). It also implicates cases where, after conviction, defendant requests
DNA testing but the record shows the defendant's attorney made a strategic
decision to not pursue DNA testing. See People v. Brown, 162 Misc. 2d 555, 558
(N.Y. Co. Ct. 1994); Wistle v. State, 525 N.W.2d 860 (Iowa 1994); People v.
Vaughn, 505 N.W.2d 41,45 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), rev'don othergrounds,People
v. Vaughn, 524 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1994); People v. Kellar, 605 N.Y.S.2d 486
(N.Y. 1993). But see State v. Thomas, 586 A.2d 250 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991). The linchpin ofthe latter cases is the judgment that the defendant's attorney
made a strategic decision to not have testing done. Compare Smith v. Edwards,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7414 (No. 98-Civ-7962) (S.D. N.Y. 2000) at *16-18
(habeas petitioner's claim that prosecutor had obligation to conduct DNA testing
rejected because petitioner's defense attorney made strategic decision not to request
DNA testing at trial). As Smith discusses, the failure of a request undercuts the
influence of the Brady v. Marylandobligation of the state. Id. at *18.
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Pape.5 This is what civil rights law is all about: institutional behavior
born of bureaucratic incentives that cause government actors to
blindly harm society's scorned populations-you are thinking Brown
v. Board of Education,6 Carolene Products' footnote 4,7 and
structural reform.
You are relishing the little things about the case which you know
have averted insurmountable hurdles. First, your client has already
been proven innocent of the crime and released from prison. Apart
from the substantial difficulty to be encountered in obtaining DNA
testing8 and securing a convicted prisoner's release, 9 there are
5. 365 U.S. 167, 181 S. Ct. 473 (1961), overruledby, Monell v. Dept. of Soc.
Services of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978).
6. Brown v. Bd. ofEduc. ofTopeka County (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.
Ct. 686 (1954); Brown v. Bd. ofEduc. ofTopeka County (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294,
75 S. Ct. 753 (1955).
7. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4, 58 S. Ct. 778, 783 (1938).
8. A couple of recent cases uphold the right to DNA testing under the
Constitution. Cherrix v. Braxton, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2231 at *29-35 (001377) (E.D. Va. 2001) (discussing the relationship between the "actual innocence"
requirement in habeas actions and access to DNA testing); Harvey v. Horan, 119
F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D. Va. 2000) (setting out grounds for DNA testing).
9. See Karen Christian, Note, "And the DNA Shall Set You Free": Issues
SurroundingPostconvictionDNA Evidenceand the PursuitofInnocence,62 Ohio
St. L.J. 1195 (2001).
No federal court ruled on the constitutional right to DNA testing until Harvey v.
Horan, 119 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D. Va. 2000) (recognizing constitutional right to
DNA testing). CompareBrison v. Tester, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18193 at *46-47
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (right to DNA testing not clearly established in 1992). However,
as early as the 1990s several courts had already ruled on post-conviction access to
evidence for the purpose of DNA testing. See Dabbs v. Vergari, 570 N.Y.S.2d 765
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990); People v. Callace, 573 N.Y.S.2d 137 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1991);
State v. Thomas, 586 A.2d 250 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1991); Sewell v. State,
592 N.E.2d 705,707-08 (Ind. Ct. App. 3 Dist. 1992); State v. Hammond, 604 A.2d
793 (Conn. 1992); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 427 (Minn. 1989);
Commonwealth v. Brison, 618 A.2d 420 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
While the cases are fact intensive, each of them relies in part on federal
constitutional authority for support, with some focus on the fundamental fairness
requirement of the due process clause. See Thomas, 586 A.2d at 254. But, most
follow the Dabbs court and focus on a version of the Brady doctrine. Dabbs
argued:
it is well established that, notwithstanding the absence of a statutory right to
postconviction discovery, a defendant has a constitutional right to be
informed of exculpatory information known to the State .... A corollary to
the duty of disclosure is the duty to preserve exculpatory material .... By
a parity of reasoning, where evidence has been preserved which has high
exculpatory potential, that evidence should be discoverable after conviction.
Due process is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances. It is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands. Clearly, an advance in
technology may constitute such a change in circumstance . . . . [I]f
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insurmountable bars to civil rights suits of this type for incarcerated
prisoners. Not only must any challenge directly or indirectly
implicating the fact or duration ofconfinement be brought in difficult
to win habeas proceedings,'0 no § 1983 cause of action challenging
problems with the conviction (and perhaps other defects of
confinement) arises until after the equivalent of a judicial finding of
innocence." Second, you realize that, despite your client's thirst to
challenge his initial conviction, this is a rare case, early in the life of
DNA testing, where your client was refused testing in isolation from
[defendant] were to be tried now, he would be entitled to DNA testing of the
physical evidence. The need for testing is analogous to that considered in
[cases] where the evidence was a controlled substance. [In such cases, a]
"defendant's guilt or innocence h[a]ng[s] exclusively on the nature and
amount of the substance in question .... For refutation of the charge
against him, there [i]s no acceptable alternative to scientific testing by
experts of his choice." Similarly, in this case, while it is unclear what
[DNA] testing will ultimately reveal,... [i]f DNA testing could exclude
that semen as belonging to [defendant], it would strongly impeach the
credibility of the victim's identification of [defendant] .... [T]o deny
[defendant] the opportunity to prove his innocence with such evidence
simply to ensure the finality of convictions is untenable.
Dabbs, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 767-69 (citations omitted). The Thomas court also
suggested that the state's failure to submit material for DNA analysis may implicate
its obligation to reveal exculpatory evidence, as set forth in Brady v. Maryland.
Thomas, 586 A.2d at 252-53. See also Sewell, 592 N.E.2d at 708; State v.
Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422,427 (Minn. 1989); State v. Hammond, 604 A.2d 793,
806-08 (Conn. 1992). In Callace, the New York court revisited the Dabbs
situation. Disagreeing with the exculpatory evidence analysis applied in Dabbs,the
Callacecourt nevertheless granted the defendant's request on the basis that DNA
testing ofthe samples constituted after-discovered evidence. Callace,573 N.Y.S.2d
at 139-140.
Recent decisions have consistently followed these precedents.
See
Commonwealth v. Moss, 689 A.2d 259, 262-63 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (following
Commonwealthv. Brison). Accord Commonwealth v. Robinson, 682 A.2d 831 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1996). See Jenner v. Dooley, 590 N.W.2d 463, 471-72 (S.D. 1999)
("elementary fairness" might compel post-conviction DNA testing); State v. ElTabeck, 610 N.W.2d 737, 750 (Garrard, J., concurring) (Neb. 2000) (due process
concerns necessitate system through which evidence could be obtained to prove
actual innocence). CompareJenkins v. Scully, 1992 WL 32342 (No. Civ-91-298E)
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) (state ordered to produce evidence for DNA testing in habeas
proceeding).
See alsoDevelopments in the Law: Confrontingthe New ChallengesofScientific
Evidence, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1481 (1995). National Comm. on the Future of DNA
Evidence, Nat'l. Inst. of Justice, United States Dep't. of Justice, Pub. No. NCJ
177626, Post Conviction DNA Testing: Recommendations for Handling Requests
[hereinafter, "Future of DNA Testing"]. For a general discussion of use of
scientific evidence, see Randi Weiss et al., The Use of Genetic Testing in the
Courtroom,34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 889 (1999).
10. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S. Ct. 1827 (1973).
11. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 117 S. Ct. 2364 (1994); Edwards v.
Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S. Ct. 1584 (1997).
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the complexities ofhis conviction, appeals, and habeas proceedings. 2
So while your client does not have a claim for false or malicious
prosecution, 3 his claim is neatly framed as an access to courts
claim.' 4 Although this is not the clearest claim in the Constitution,
12. Any continued, ongoing criminal litigation would prompt Younger
abstention. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971).
13. This was the subject of Heck, prompting the court to require a finding of
innocence prior to any § 1983 suit for false or malicious prosecution. Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994).
14. While an access to court claim in these precise facts has not been decided,
"It is clearly established that prisoners have a constitutionally protected right of
access to the courts." Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 820 (5th Cir. 1993). See
also,Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (citations omitted); Johnson v. Avery,
393 U.S. 483, 89 S. Ct. 787 (1969); Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir.
1999) (prisoners "are guaranteed 'the conferral of a capability--the capability of
bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions ofconfinement before
the courts' (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2182);
Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1986); Ryland v. Shapiro, 708
F.2d 967, 971 (5th Cir. 1983). Justice Scalia's recent description of the right of
access to the court in his majority opinion in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S.
Ct. 2174 (1996) warrants extensive quotation:
[T]he right that Bounds acknowledged was the [already well-established]
right ofaccessto the courts.In the cases to which Bounds traced its roots,
we had protected that right by prohibiting state prison officials from
actively interfering with inmates' attempts to prepare legal documents, or
file them, and by requiring state courts to waive filing fees, or transcript
fees for indigent inmates. Bounds focused on the same entitlement of
access to the courts.
Insofar as the right vindicated by Bounds is concerned, "meaningful
access to the courts is the touchstone," and the inmate therefore must go
one step further and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the
library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal
claim. He might show, for example, that a complaint he prepared was
dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because
ofdeficiencies in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not have
known. Or that he had suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished
to bring before the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies ofthe law
library that he was unable even to file a complaint.
Id. at 350-51, 116 S. Ct. at 2179-80 (citations omitted).
Justice Scalia's opinion is understood as establishing a two-part test to establish
an actionable denial of access to the courts. A prisoner must show acts denying
access and actual harm. Lewis thus limits the right in Bounds by recognizing in that
decision an "actual injury" requirement. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351, 116 S. Ct. at 2180;
Chiceol, 169 F.3d at 137 ("the Supreme Court held [in Lewis] that an inmate
alleging denial ofaccess to courts must demonstrate an actual injury stemming from
defendants' unconstitutional conduct.") See also Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d
273, 275 (5th Cir. 1998) ("without proving an actual injury, a prisoner cannot
prevail on an access-to-the-courts claim"). Lewis also suggests that an apparent
violation of the right to access to the courts might be justified by a showing that
legitimate interests necessitate the action in question. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 361, 116
S. Ct. at 2185.
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you suspect its novelty and the fact of your client's innocence will
buttress your case.' 5 Third, you are pleased to discover that, though
you need not challenge the conduct of the trial itself, the conviction
turned on only two pieces of evidence: notoriously unreliable
eyewitness identification evidence 6 and forensic comparison ofblood
and semen evidence. Sadly, but advantageous to your client at this
stage, the case was a rape case-the prime candidate for DNA testing
to establish innocence.' 7 Fourth, you are somewhat outraged to
discover that, all the while the prosecutor's office was refusing your
client access to the evidence in the case to test, they were employing
DNA testing in their prosecution."
15. The right to access to courts is, even after Lewis, a broad one. The
parameters ofthe right to access is famously described in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817, 97 S. Ct. 1491 (1977), a case upholding a prisoner's right to access to legal
materials. The right to access to courts is fundamental and long established.
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821-22, 97 S. Ct. 1494-95. Access must be adequate,
effective, and meaningful. Id. at 822-23, 97 S. Ct. at 1495. Meaningful access to
courts might require affirmative actions by states. "Moreover, our decisions have
consistently required States to shoulder affirmative obligations to assure all
prisoners meaningful access to the courts." Id. at 824, 97 S. Ct. at 1496. The right
of access in Bounds specifically concerned the right of access to post-conviction
remedies and especially the preliminary preparation of petitions and complaints.
See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 827-28 & n.17, 97 S. Ct. at 1497-98.
The right to access here also draws support from the main areas where the right
has been found. Access to the evidence used at trial for the purpose of DNA testing
is almost identical to the right to a transcript of the trial proceedings; denying
plaintiff access to the evidence is no less a violation than denying him access to the
trial transcript. See Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 92 S. Ct. 410 (1971) where
the right to a trial transcript was found to be supported by Supreme Court's
longstanding jurisprudence concerning right to transcripts as a necessary part ofthe
right of access to courts: "'it is now fundamental that, once established.., avenues
(of appellate review) must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only
impede open and equal access to the courts' .... In terms of a trial record, this
means that the State must afford the indigent a 'record of sufficient completeness'
to permit proper consideration of (his) claims."' Id. at 193-94, 92 S. Ct. at 414
(citations omitted).
16. See generally Jennifer L. Devenport et al., Eyewitness Identification
Evidence: EvaluatingCommonsenseEvaluations,3 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y. & L. 338
(1997). On the narrower, but as troubling, problem of unreliable cross-racial
identification, see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in
CriminalCases, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 934 (1984). See also John P. Rutledge, They
AIl Look Alike: The InaccuracyofCross-RacialIdentifications,28 Am. J. Crirn. L.
207 (2001) and references cited therein. Id. at 211-14 nn.31-52.
17. See Future of DNA Testing, supra note 9; Christian,supranote 9.
18. Many jurisdictions adopted forensic DNA testing as a crime control
technique as soon as the technique became readily available. See Michelle Hibbert,
DNA Databanks:LawEnforcement'sGreatestSurveillanceTool?, 34 Wake Forest
L. Rev. 767 (1999). All jurisdictions currently maintain databases with the DNA
profile of at least all convicted sex offenders, though many have already extended
the data base to include all felony convicts or all misdemeanor sex offense convicts,
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As it turns out, many ofthese facts will prove detrimental to your
client's case, but oblivious to the minefield that is civil rights
litigation, you head offto battle, utterly unprepared for what you will
encounter. Indeed, everyone you describe your client's tale to is
certain, like you, that you will succeed fabulously. Oh, but what you
do not know. You are about to discover the truth about civil rights
litigation.
I. MODERN CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION: IS THERE ANYTHING LEFT?

Whether our naive lawyer can succeed in his civil rights suit turns
out to be an enormously complicated question. In this foreword I
hope to highlight some ofthe perils she will encounter, but first a few
simplifying assumptions. Although the reported cases do not clearly
set out whether a convicted prisoner has a right to access to courts,
which includes the right to inspect the physical evidence actually used
to convict him, I will assume such a right exists (subject to reasonable
restrictions aimed at protecting the evidence).' 9 In doing so I am
putting aside likely disputes over what is reasonable inspection and
who bears the cost of such inspections. However, like the right to a
trial transcript, the right to inspect physical evidence, however
conditioned, seems essential to any reasonable right to access the
courts. ° I am also assuming away the most difficult questions related
and there is a move to add all felons arrested to these databases. As Hibbert notes:
[I]n the beginning only those classes ofoffenders with a high recidivism
rate, such as sex offenders and violent felons, became mandatory DNA
database donors. For the most part these DNA databanking laws were
grounded in the belief that the compelling interest in solving past and
future crimes justified any imposition on a convicted criminal's privacy
interest in not having his or her DNA digitized in the state database. But
just one year after the passage of the first state DNA database law in
Virginia, South Dakota passed a DNA databasing statute that required
blood samples from all those arrested.
Hibbert, supra, at 769. As early as 1999, Hibbert could report that
[flour states require DNA samples from all convicted felons, violent or
non-violent.., at least eight states require the collection ofblood from
certain classes of convicted misdemeanants ....
Under a Louisiana
law.., law enforcement officials will collect DNA samples from adults
and juveniles arrested for sex offenses or certain violent felonies.
[And,] [u]nder Texas law, .. . [a person]... previously convicted of
a sex offense.., is required to submit a DNA sample.
Hibbert, supra,at 775-76.
Today most jurisdictions employ forensic DNA evidence in criminal trials, even
jurisdictions which oppose DNA testing as a basis for exoneration of convicts. As
of 1999, "the FBI report[ed] that... forensic DNA evidence ha[d] been relied upon
in over 6800 cases." Hibbert, supra,at 774.
19. See discussionsupranotes 14 and 15.
20. CompareMayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 92 S. Ct. 410 (1971) (right to
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to DNA testing of convicts by assuming the unlikely case that
prosecutors would refuse testing without articulating any valid state
interests.2 ' Most reported cases involving DNA testing testify to the
ingenuity of prosecutors at perceiving reasons that testing should be
denied a convict. 22 Finally, it is fair to say that the hypothetical case
is inspired by an actual case in which I was involved on behalf of a
freed prisoner.23
The difficulties our attorney will encounter begin at the very start
of litigation. Knowing that these cases present a minefield for
free trial transcript); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310, 186 S. Ct. 1497, 1500
(1966) (unreasoned limits on access to court to be lifted); Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 446, 82 S. Ct. 917, 921 (1962) (record of sufficient
completeness to make appeal required).
The right to DNA testing has been upheld recently in a federal ruling. Harvey v.
Horan, 119 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D. Va. 2000). CompareBrison v. Tester, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18193 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (right to DNA testing not clearly established
in 1992). It has also been upheld in several state court opinions dating as far back
as 1990. See Dabbs v. Vergari, 570 N.Y.S.2d 765; People v. Callace, 573 N.Y.S.2d
137; State v. Thomas, 586 A.2d 250; Sewell v. State, 592 N.E.2d 705, 707-08;
State v. Hammond, 604 A.2d 793 (Conn. 1992); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d
422, 427 (Minn. 1989); Commonwealth v. Brison, 618 A.2d 420. More recently,
see Commonwealth v. Moss, 689 A.2d 259, 162 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (following
Brison);Commonwealth v. Robinson, 682 A.2d 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); Jenner
v. Dooley, 590 N.W.2d 463, 471-72 (N.D. 1999); State v. El-Tabeck, 610 N.W.
2d 737. Compare Jenkins v. Scully, 1992 WL 32342 (No. Civ-91-298E)
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) (state ordered to produce evidence for DNA testing in habeas
proceeding).
21. Such cases do exist. See the State's Response to Defendant's Request for
DNA Testing, State of Louisiana v. Charles, No. 106,980 (32nd Judicial District
Court, Parish of Terrebonne, September 14, 1993).
22. See, e.g., Mebne v. State, 902 P.2d 494, 497 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995)
(rejecting request for post-conviction DNA testing, saying testing would be
appropriate where (1) there was single perpetrator, or (2) the person was convicted
with "weak" evidence that might be overcome by DNA tests).
23. See reported decisions in Charles v. Greenberg, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13665 (E.D. La. 2001) (case dismissed as res judicata on basis of plaintiffs
release); Charles v. Greenberg, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18349 (E.D. La. 2000)
(prosecutors' refusal to release rape kit for DNA testing protected by absolute
prosecutorial immunity).
The freed prisoner, Clyde Charles, was released in December 1999 after a nine
year effort to conduct DNA testing at his own expense. During this odyssey he was
represented by the Innocence Project ofCardozo Law School and its founder Barry
Scheck. In his efforts to obtain compensation for the nine years he was denied
testing, he was not represented by the naive counsel represented in the hypothetical
case. Quite the contrary, he was represented by noted Louisiana criminal defense
and environmental tort litigator, Lewis Unglesby, and State Senator and former
Congressman, Cleo Fields.
On the Charles cases, see generally Rhonda Bell, DNA-Freed Prisoner's
Nightmare Finally Over, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Jan. 13, 2000, at Al;
Rhonda Bell, Time Limit FrustratesRequestsforDNA Tests Righting Old Wrongs
in Some States, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), December 28, 1999, at Al.
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plaintiffs, few defendants are going to engage in early settlement
negotiations;24 indeed, the defendant is likely to be adversarial from
the start, given the subject matter ofthe suit and the antagonistic view
many have of civil rights litigation. If our attorney is a typical
24. In a provocative study of civil right practitioners' views of the practice,
Julie Davies found that, despite the existence of attorneys' fees as an incentive for
parties to settle civil rights cases, few settle.
In the police misconduct area, for example, some plaintiffs' counsel
claim that they have not received reasonable settlement offers until right
before trial, if at all. A number of plaintiffs' attorneys perceive certain
public entity defendants as being unwilling to settle cases under any
circumstances .... The defense attorneys interviewed confirmed that
settlements with certain public entities are extremely hard to achieve,
although they differ somewhat as to the reasons for this difficulty ....
Although the plaintiffs' attorneys found attorneys for private defendants
to be much more willing to negotiate than those representing public
entities, they still noted a reluctance to settle that seemed to hurt, rather
than further, the defendants' best interests. One plaintiffs' attorney
practicing employment law stated that sometimes defendants seem to
expect lawsuits no matter what they do and consider them so much a cost
of doing business that they do not even try to distinguish a factually
meritorious claim from a non-meritorious claim until shortly before trial,
when attorneys' fees and costs are astronomical on each side.
Julie Davies, FederalCivil Rights Practicein the 1990's: The Dichotomy Between
Reality and Theory, 48 Hastings L.J. 197, 220-21 (1997) (footnotes omitted). In
explanation for the lack of settlements, plaintiffs' and defense attorneys offered
differing, but overlapping explanations:
...Private defense counsel, [plaintiffs' attorneys] say, have a personal
interest in prolonging litigation because their billable hours increase. They
are working for clients who expect to pay by the hour and to spend a lot of
money on fees. Attorneys who are directly employed by public entities are
said to be enmeshed in hierarchal bureaucracies where political issues
predominate, and business sense and honest legal appraisal fall short ....
A city attorney acknowledged that institutional clients often have a huge
amount invested in maintaining an institutional structure intact. For some
of these clients, settlements may be tantamount to political suicide. The
defense attorneys interviewed likewise concurred with plaintiffs' attorneys
that some entities are so hierarchical that achieving settlements is difficult
and extremely time-consuming. Unlike plaintiffs' attorneys, however, the
defense attorneys interviewed also cited concerns such as discouraging
non-meritorious litigation or the need for caution when recommending the
expenditure of tax money, as reasons for failing to settle cases.
Davies, supraat 220-21. Nor has the prospect of sanctions under Rule 68 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S 1, 105 S. Ct.
31012 (1985) (plaintiffloses attorney's fees and cost if he rejects settlement offer
and receives less in judgment, notwithstanding attorneys' fee statute), encouraged
settlement in civil rights cases. Apparently, it is difficult for defense counsel to
accurately estimate the value of civil rights cases, especially if the attorney's fees
might be inflated between the offer and trial, and it is difficult to convince defense
clients to agree to make a realistic settlement offer at an early date. Davies, supra,
at 223-25.
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plaintiff's attorney, this alone will come as quite a shock. But when
the formal process begins" she will be in for quite a few more.
In several jurisdictions she will be required to comply with
heightened pleading rules. Although, in Leatherman v. Tarrant
County 6 the Supreme Court invalidated such rules for suits against
municipal defendants, several circuits, including the Fifth Circuit
where the Leatherman case originated, have read that opinion
narrowly and continue to apply heightened pleading requirements to
The pleading rule is justified as
cases against individuals.2
25. A further assumption is that the suit will be filed as a § 1983 suit. The suit
might be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), but that cause of action, today, adds
little to a § 1983 suit. See John Valery White, VindicatingRights in a Federal
System: Rediscovering42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 's Equality Right, 69 Temp. L. Rev.
145 (1996) ("Section 1985(3) is dead."). Suit might also be maintained under state
law. As Professor Devlin argues, state constitutional rights have not always
provided a happy refuge. 63 Devlin, 63 La. L. Rev. 885 (2003). Consequently,
most state-based grounds will be rooted in tort law. In our hypothetical, tort law
provides no comfort, as there is no tort theory readily applicable, given the
prisoner's lack of a property interest in those samples in the rape kit that are taken
from the rape victim and the minimal interest in his own biological material related
to notions like abandonment.
26. 507 U.S. 163, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993). InLeatherman,"[t]he Supreme
Court abrogated the Fifth Circuit heightened pleading requirement for actions
against municipalities." Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443
(5th Cir. 1999). The Leatherman Court said, "We think that it is impossible to
square the 'heightened pleading standard' applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case
with the liberal system of 'notice pleading' set up bythe Federal Rules. Rule 8(a)(2)
requires that a complaint include only 'a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."' 507 U.S. at 168, 113 S. Ct. at 1163.
The LeathermanCourt continued, "In Conley v. Gibson, we said in effect that the
Rule meant what it said:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out
in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the
Rules require is "a short and plain statement of the claim" that will give
the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests."
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
The Supreme Court has recently extended the Leatherman holding to
employment discrimination cases under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Akos Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S. Ct. 992 (2002).
27. See, e.g., Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995). Today
the Seventh and Tenth Circuits reject heightened pleading in all cases; the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits require heightened pleading in all cases not covered by
Leatherman;and the D. C. and Ninth Circuits require heightened pleading in cases
where intent is an element. See Christopher M. Fairman, HeightenedPleading,81
Tex. L. Rev. 551, 584-88 (2002). Heightened Pleading has been consistently
criticized by commentators. In addition to Fairman, see, e.g., C. Keith Wingate, A
Special PleadingRulefor Civil Rights Complaints: A Step Forwardor a Step
Back?, 49 Mo. L. Rev. 677, 693 (1984) (questioning the rationale for stricter
pleading in civil rights cases).
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facilitating individual immunities (which municipalities do not
enjoy)" by providing detailed information on the basis of the suit
with which a judge can dispose of the case on the pleadings.29
However, this basis for heightened pleading creates a
contradiction which circuits requiring heightened pleading have not
resolved. In cases naming official policy makers in both their
individual and official capacities, the policy goals of heightened
pleading are necessarily unfulfilled because the individual defendant
will be involved in the litigation-subject to discovery, required to
testify, etc.-whether he remains in the suit in his individual capacity.
Indeed, even non-policymaking individual defendants, for whom
there is no good reason to name in their official capacity,30 will
usually still be subject to many of the inconveniences oftrial, if only
as witnesses.3' If an individual is named in his individual and
28.
InMonell [v. New York City Dept.ofSocialServices,436 U.S. 658,98 S.
Ct. 2018 (1978)] we overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct.
473, insofar as it held that local governments were wholly immune from
suit under § 1983, though we did reserve decision on whether
municipalities are entitled to some form oflimited immunity. 436 U.S. at
701, 98 S. Ct. at 2041. Yet, when we took that issue up again in Owen v.
City oflndependence,445 U.S. 622, 650, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1415 (1980),
we rejected a claim that municipalities should be afforded qualified
immunity, much like that afforded individual officials, based on the good
faith of their agents. These decisions make it quite clear that, unlike
various government officials, municipalities do not enjoy immunity from
suit--either absolute or qualified-under § 1983. In short, a municipality
can be sued under § 1983, but it cannot be held liable unless a municipal
policy or custom caused the constitutional injury.
Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 507 U.S. 163, 166, 113 S. Ct. at 1162 (1993). See
also Stefanoffv. Hays County, 154 F.3d 523, 525 (5th Cir. 1998) ("As an initial
matter, we observe that municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity.")
(citing Leatherman). CompareCrawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595, 118 S.
Ct. 1584, 1585 (1998) ("[O]ur cases demonstrate that questions regarding pleading,
discovery, and summary judgment are most frequently and effectively resolved
either by the rule making process or the legislative process.") (rejecting heightened
pleading in cases involving improper motive).
29. "[N]o heightened pleading is required in actions against individual
defendants in their official capacities, because 'official-capacity lawsuits are
typically an alternative means ofpleading an action against the governmental entity
involved[.].' Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d at 443 (citation
omitted).
30. Unless an officer controls a budget or directs others, their "official
capacity" exists only abstractly. Indeed, it is hard to imagine what a beating police
officer's official capacity is, much less to understand what funds would pay a
reward against such an officer in that capacity. It is possible, perhaps, that the
coverage of certain insurance contracts could make a suit against a subordinate
officer in his official capacity advisable.
31. This is especially true if their basis for release from the suit is that they
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official capacities and that official is an official policy maker,
heightened pleading ought not apply because the policy goals
underlying heightened pleading are unfulfilled. Rather, heightened
pleading should be understood as a gratuitous barrier in civil rights
litigation, erected to discourage such suits.
In any case, this distinction is important because courts
employing heightened pleading rules also routinely issue protective
orders barring all discovery against individual defendants until the
immunity questions are answered.32 These protective orders are
also rooted in the policy bases behind individual immunities.33 Like
heightened pleading, however, they are strictly inapplicable to an
official policymaker who is named in his official capacity. 34 That
officer will be the subject of discovery no matter the resolution of
his individual immunities. By the same token, so long as the
official policy maker or the municipality is named, the protective
order would seem to be inapplicable since the individual officers
might still be subject to discovery in the suit against their superior
or employer. Courts employing these techniques have often ignored
these arguments, seeming to use heightened pleading and protective
orders as a replacement for the notice of claims rules that states
unsuccessfully sought to impose on civil rights claims in the

acted pursuant to an apparently legal city policy.
32. See, e.g., Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 507-08 (5th Cir. 1987).
In his excellent article on heightened pleading, Professor Fairman says
Courts initially turned to heightened pleading out ofan apparent hostility
to civil rights cases; they retained it as a procedural fix to murky and
shifting qualified immunity jurisprudence. The end result compelled civil
rights plaintiffs to plead facts, often relating to the state of mind of the
defendant, without the benefit of discovery.
Fairman,supra note 27, at 552.
33.
[The] defendant's entitlement under immunity doctrine to be free from suit
and the burden of avoidable pretrial matters is effectively lost if the case
erroneously goes to trial .

. .

. [T]he refusal to rule on such claims

"conclusively determines the defendant's claim of right not to standtrial"
...[and because] the claim of immunity in both cases "is conceptually
distinct from the merits of the plaintiff's claim that his rights have been
violated."
Helton v. Clements, 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir.1986) (citations omitted).
34.
[E]ven if Leathermanpermits a heightened standard to be maintained for
public officials sued as individuals, no heightened standard can be allowed
for actions against individual defendants in their official capacities. This
is true, and the Supreme Court has explained that official-capacity lawsuits
are typically an alternative means of pleading an action against the
governmental entity involved ....
Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1996).
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1980s." Defendants get the benefit of a full articulation of the
plaintiffs claims without any requirement of sharing information
with the plaintiff.
Our attorney will face the challenge of framing a complaint and
defending a motion to dismiss on immunity grounds without the
benefit of discovery. If she is foolish enough to follow the federal
rules in drafting her complaint she will be rudely educated. Though
I have made the hypothetical easy by assuming that the defendants
in fact offered no reason to refuse DNA testing, drafting the
complaint is actually quite difficult. To state a constitutional
violation, the plaintiff will have to show evidence that the
defendants' decisions were extreme and outrageous or at least
deliberately indifferent to constitutional rights. These motiverelated matters will require discovery to establish and will need to
be presented as more than bald supposition about the defendants'
motives. Illegal motives like malice or discriminatory intent will be
completely hidden. Moreover, which parties participated in the
decision-making process will be also be unclear. Yet naming each
party likely to have participated in the decision-making process will
be essential to the litigation, despite the limits on discovery likely
to follow and likely to constrain the process of tracing who did
what, when, and why.
Individual immunities are themselves a severe impediment. It
is not clear that prosecutors acting as custodians of evidence after
all trial, appellate, and habeas proceedings are terminated are actin
in their prosecutorial, investigative, or administrative capacities.
Some courts have found that once the prosecutorial role is triggered37
by the filing of a charge or indictment, it continues into perpetuity.
35. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988).
36. Absolute immunity is available when the prosecutor is performing certain
functions that are quasi-judicial in nature. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,
268-69, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2613 (1993) ("some officials perform 'special functions'
which, because of their similarity to functions that would have been immune when
Congress enacted § 1983, deserve absolute protection from damages liability")
(citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2911 (1978)). The
Supreme Court has "applied a 'functional approach,' which looks to 'the nature of
the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it,"' Buckley,
509 U.S. at 269, 113 S. Ct. at 1613 (citations omitted). "It is clear from both the
Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit jurisprudence, that when a prosecutor takes on a
function other than that of state advocate in a criminal prosecution, the scope ofhis
immunity is curtailed accordingly. It is 'the nature of the function preformed, not
the identity ofthe actor who performed it' that matters in deciding whether absolute
or qualified immunity applies." Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269, 113 S. Ct. at 2613
(quoting Forrester,484 U.S. at 229, 108 S. Ct. at 545). Lucas v. Parish of
Jefferson, 999 F. Supp. 839, 846 (E.D. La. 1998).
37. The Fourth Circuit held that a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity for
ongoing advocacy on behalf ofthe state in direct appeals of the plaintiff. Carter v.
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If the denial of access to the evidence for testing is in the
prosecutorial capacity, the individual prosecutors enjoy absolute
immunity and cannot be sued in their individual capacity. Even in
their investigatory or individual capacities, they are likely to enjoy
immunity from suit because of circuits' generous view of qualified
immunity.38 Not only must the plaintiff prove that the immunity is
Burch, 34 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1994). The key in Carterwas the fact that the
prosecutor's challenged acts took place when the prosecutor was actively handling
the direct appeals of the plaintiff.
[T]he evidence is uncontradicted that, at the time Burch testified that
he learned of the [evidence] and failed to disclose it, he was handling
the post-conviction motions and the initial direct appeal to the Court of
Appeals of Virginia, after which the Attorney General's office took
over. In these post-trial motions and preparations for appeal, Burch
was still functioning as an advocate for the State, and not in an
investigatory capacity.
Carter, 34 F.3d at 263. In contrast, in Houston v. Partee,978 F.2d 362 (7th Cir.
1992), the Seventh Circuit held that absolute immunity was unavailable to a
prosecutor after all direct appeals were exhausted and the prosecutor was no longer
involved in litigation against the convict on behalf of the state. It reasoned that
apart from failing to satisfy the policy goals of absolute immunity, id. at 367-68,
there was
another method for discerning the dividing line between absolute and
qualified immunity: "whether the injury depends on the judicial decision.
If there would be no loss but for the judge's acts, then the prosecutor or
witness who induces the judge to act has absolute immunity." Previously,
this test has only been applied to pre-conviction prosecutorial abuses, and
applying it to the facts in this case is somewhat awkward. We believe,
however, that it also supports our holding. The defendant prosecutors
discovered and then suppressed the exculpatory evidence after Houston
and Brown had been convicted .... [T]here was an actionable harm
without the mediation ofa judge. Every day that the prosecutors failed to
disclose the exculpatory evidence was a day that Houston and Brown were
wrongly imprisoned. This injury does not flow from (and the plaintiffs are
not seeking damages for) Wharrie's prosecution of the wrong men or the
conduct of the prosecution on appeal. Rather, Houston and Brown seek
damages for the defendant prosecutors' failure to correct Wharrie's
mistake once they discovered evidence that Houston and Brown may not
be guilty.
Houston, 978 F.2d at 368 n.4 (citations omitted).
Immunity law was applied to DNA claims in the Third Circuit in Brisonv. Tester,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18193 (E.D. Pa. 1994). In Brison the prosecutors were
entitled to absolute immunity because all the DNA testing-related claims took place
after Brison had been charged and while the prosecutors were preparing for trial.
Id.at *60-64. Even the claims in Brison concerning the prosecutors' post appeals
behavior take place in the context ofon-going litigation on his guilt-the delays the
prosecutor is accused of precipitating are delays in scheduling a new trial at which
Brison's innocence can be established. To this point his appeal remained active as
the case was on remand from the appellate court; this behavior is probably quasijudicial and reasonably protected by absolute immunity. Id. at *64-70.
38. Qualified immunity is generally available to executive officers. Harlow v.
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inapplicable because the officer violated clearly established law at the
time of the decision, most circuits define "clearly established" as
governed by a case on point in that Circuit or the Supreme Court.39
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807-08, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2732-33 (1982). See alsoButz
v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974). Qualified immunity is, generally, a broad immunity;
it protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1096 (1986). "Discussing
in detail the considerations that also had underlain [its] decision in Scheuer, [the
Court] explained [in Butz] that the recognition of a qualified immunity defense for
high executives reflected an attempt to balance competing values: not only the
importance ofa damages remedy to protect the rights ofcitizens, but also 'the need
to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related
public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise ofofficial authority."' Harlow,
457 U.S. at 807, 102 S. Ct. at 2732 (citations omitted). Later in Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987), the Court reaffirmed that
qualified immunity applies to the acts of FBI agents, even for decisions that
inherently involve subjective determinations like probable cause and exigency.
Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that qualified immunity turns, not on the
subjective intention of officers, but on "the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the
action, assessed in light ofthe legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time
it was taken." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S. Ct. at 3038 (citations omitted).
Circuit courts have given qualified immunity a broad scope by defining "clearly
established" legal principles narrowly. But see Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122
S. Ct. 2508 (2002) (clearly established law need not be established in case with
"materially similar" facts).
39. This view is expressed strongly in Medina v. City & County ofDenver,960
F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992): "Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly
established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or
the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the
law to be as the plaintiff maintains." The Tenth Circuit has softened that rule,
emphasizing the second part over the first. Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care,
195 F.3d 584, 594 (10th Cir. 1999). However, other circuits have maintained such
a view. The most clear are the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits. Jean v.
Collins, 155 F.3d 701, 709 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (ordinarily decisions outside
the circuit do not establish clearly established law); Jenkins by Hall v. Talladega
City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 826 n.4 (11 th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Ohio Civil
Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177 (6th Cir. 1988) (absent
extraordinary circumstances, clearly established law cannot be found in other
courts). See also Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231,251 (4th Cir. 1999).
Courts have also addressed other administrative issues related to clearly established
law. These include determining the closeness of facts to the case at bar, see Suissa
v. Fulton County, 74 F.3d 266, 269-70 (11 th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S. Ct. 2508 (2002), and the weight of unpublished
opinions in determining clearly established law. Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518,
525 (7th Cir. 1995) (unpublished opinions do not establish clearly established law).
Courts especially have confronted the weight to be given district court decisions in
establishing clearly established law. Hayes v. Long, 72 F.3d 70, 73-74 (8th Cir.
1995) (look to Supreme, Circuit, District, and State Supreme Court opinions);
Tribble v. Gardner, 860 F. 2d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1988) (same); Jermosen v. Smith,
945 F.2d 547, 551 (2nd Cir. 1991) (district court opinion cannot establish clearly
established law).
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While the Supreme Court has lately cast some doubt on this view of
clearly established law in Hope v. Pelzer,40the Court had added yet
40. 536 U.S. 730, 122 S. Ct. 2508(2002). InHope the Court rejected the 1lth
Circuit's use ofa "materially similar" test ofwhether the law alleged to be violated
was "clearly established" for qualified immunity purposes. The 1 th Circuit rule
would have required that a plaintiff seeking to defeat a qualified immunity claim
show that the facts alleged in his complaint were "materially similar" to those in a
prior case upholding the right in question. The Court noted that "clearly
established" law was intended to serve the same purposes as and was to be
understood as similar to the "fair warning" requirement in civil rights criminal
cases. Id. at 739-40, 122 S. Ct. at 2515. That standard, discussed in the 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 case, UnitedStates v. Lanier,520 U.S. 259, 117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997), found
fair notice "despite notable factual distinctions between the precedents relied on and
the cases then before the Court, so long as the prior decisions gave reasonable
warning that the conduct then at issue violated constitutional rights." Lanier,520
U.S. at 269, 117 S. Ct. 1227 (quoted in Hope, 536 U.S. at 740, 122 S. Ct. at 2516).
The Court continued:
This is not to say, of course, that the single warning standard points to a
single level of specificity sufficient in every instance. In some
circumstances, as when an earlier case expressly leaves open whether a
general rule applies to the particular type of conduct at issue, a very high
degree of prior factual particularity may be necessary. But general
statements ofthe law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear
warning, and in other instances a general constitutional rule already
identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the
specific conduct in question, even though 'the very action in question has
[not] previously been held unlawful[.]'
Hope, 536 U.S. at 740, 741, 122 S. Ct. at 2516 (quoting Lanier,520 U.S. at 271,
117 S. Ct. at 1227). This view of "clearly established" is adopted by Justice
Thomas in his vigorous dissent.
That is not to say, of course, that conduct can be "clearly established"
as unlawful only if a court has already passed on the legality of that
behavior under materially similar circumstances. Certain actions so
obviously run afoul ofthe law that an assertion ofqualified immunity may
be overcome even though court decisions have yet to address "materially
similar" conduct.
Hope, 536 U.S. at 753, 122 S. Ct. at 2522 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
This language is quite broad and would seem to preclude both "material
similarity" and similar tests of "clearly established." However, neither the Court
nor the dissent mention other tests, like the "case on point in the circuit" test
articulated by other jurisdictions. See supra note 39. Support for this effect is
found in the Fifth Circuit's abandonment of its cases from the circuit only rule in
Shipp v. McMahon, 234 F.3d 907, 915 (5th Cir. 2000) and McClendon v. City of
Columbia,305 F.3d 314, 328-29 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). However, the Fifth
Circuit's application of the clearly established law requirement in McClendon
implied that it had not adopted a broad view of when the law was established,
despite citing Hope.
Noted Civil Rights scholar Karen Blum has argued that the IIth Circuit has
ignored Hope, creating an unduly restrictive qualified immunity law which
"combined with the Monell doctrine of no vicarious liability for the public entity,
leaves many wronged plaintiffs without a remedy under § 1983." Karen M, Blum,
Eleventh Circuit is Out of Step, National L. J., Apr. 21, 2003, at A13. Blum notes
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another layer of difficulty in Saucierv. Katz.4 ' In Saucier,the Court
held that even if the law violated was clearly established, the officer
might still be entitled to immunity if he acted reasonably.42 This
constituted the revival of a subjective component to immunity law,
but only in the benefit ofdefendant officers. Proving officer malice
remains an insufficient ground for overcoming claims ofimmunity."4
that in less than ten months the Eleventh Circuit has basically revived their preHopejurisprudence in three cases. See Vaughan v. Cox, 316 F.3d 1210 (1lth Cir.
2003) (existing precedent did not apply with "obvious clarity"); Willingham v.
Loughnan, 321 F.3d 1299, 1300 (11 th Cir. 2002); and Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d
950, 955 (11 th Cir. 2003) (factually similar cases cited by plaintiff do not establish
notice that government action was unlawful).
41. 533 U.S. 194, 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001).
42. Saucier ruled that even an officer who violated clearly established law
might be able to benefit from qualified immunity if his violation was produced by
a reasonable mistake as to what the law required. Saucier,533 U.S. at 205, 121 S.
Ct. at 2158. Because the case posed the question of whether a court could merge
immunity and substantive law where both turned on the reasonableness of the
officer's actions under the circumstances, some discussion ofwhat Saucierheld is
in order.
Saucier required a two-step analysis of qualified immunity defenses. First, a
court must determine if a constitutional right alleged could be established on the
facts ofthe case. Id. at 201, 121 S. Ct. at 2156. If not, the case is to be dismissed.
Second, if the right could be established on the facts, the court must ask whether
that right is clearly established "in light ofthe specific context of the case." Id. The
Court recognized that it is this second inquiry that could prove troublesome because
it seems to demand, in many cases, development of the facts surrounding the
incident. However, the Court emphasized that the inquiry is focused on whether the
"contours of the right" are "sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right," Id. at 202, 121 S. Ct. at 2156
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3039), and
that this cannot turn on fact determinations as this would undercut goals of qualified
immunity. Id. So far, this part of the Court's analysis does little more than
emphasize what the Court had already said in Harlow- but the court went further.
The Court declared that this meant "that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the
legal constraints on particular police conduct." Id. at 205, 121 S. Ct. at 2158. "If
the officer's mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable ...

the officer is

entitled to the immunity defense." Id. It seems a leap to go from rejecting the
factual development of the plaintiff's claim that might require discovery (and which
in the courts below, lead to the merger ofthe immunity and substantive inquiries),
to declaring that violations ofclearly established law might nevertheless be subject
to immunity.
43. Saucieroperates in only one direction as though a rachet: plaintiffs cannot
defeat qualified immunity by pointing to the bad faith motivating the officer's
behavior. See Harlow,457 U.S. at 815-18, 102 S. Ct. at 2736-38. But, the officer
can point to his good faith mistake in the law as a means to excuse violations oflaw
that are abundantly clear and well known.
44. Harlowbanished"good faith" from the qualified immunity analysis in order
to protect officers from the burden oftrial and pre-trial activities like discovery and
replaced it with an objective reasonableness standard. Harlow,457 U.S. at 815-19,
102 S. Ct. at 2736-38.
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The problems of individual immunities are avoided by naming a
municipal defendant in his official capacity" or simply naming the
municipal corporation."
This approach is itself barred in
jurisdictions where the local prosecutor is viewed as a state officer or
if the decision in question was the exercise of state power on behalf
ofthe state.47 In those cases the suit becomes a suit against the state,
which is not a "person" subject to suit under § 1983,4 quite apart
from the newly vigorous sovereign immunity law the court has
applied to bar suits under other statutes.49
If the plaintiff is fortunate enough to be suing a prosecutor's
office in a state that treats them as an independent municipality ° or
can otherwise link the decisions to a municipal actor, his attorney still
faces the daunting task of attributing the decisions made to that
municipality." Everyday decisions about the release of evidence for
45. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S. Ct. 3099 (1985) (Official
capacity suits "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against
an entity of which an officer is an agent").
46. Municipal corporations enjoy no immunity from suit. See Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980).
47. McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 117 S. Ct. 1734 (1997) (state
law dictated that, for certain purposes, a local sheriff is, in fact, a state officer).
48. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304
(1989). Of course, state officers are still subject to suit in their individual capacity.
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S. Ct. 358 (1991). In some instances, such suits
might be viewed as "in essence" against the state. See, e.g., Edleman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974) (suit naming state officer in individual capacity
treated as suit against state).
49. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 120 S. Ct. 631
(2000). See also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996)
and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999). In any case, § 1983 is
not an abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99
S. Ct. 1139 (1979).
50. Such is the case in Louisiana, for example. See Burge v. Parish of St.
Tammany, 187 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1999); Hudson v. New Orleans, 174 F.3d 677
(5th Cir. 1999).
51. There is, of course, no respondeat superior in § 1983 cases. Monell v.
Dept. of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978). Municipal liability is
founded on official policy or custom and usage. Board of County Commissioners
v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1390 (1997). In the absence of a
legislative policy enacted by the municipality's governing body, official policy is
established by the decisions of those municipal officers who are the official
policymakers for the municipality. City of St. Louis v. Praprolnick, 485 U.S. 112,
108 S. Ct. 915 (1988). Whether an officer is an official policymaker whose
decisions are attributable to the municipality is determined by state law. McMillian
v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 117 S. Ct. 1734 (1997); Praprotnick,485 U.S.
112, 108 S.Ct.915.
Boardof County Commissionersemphasizes that "at least two routes can lead to
the conclusion that a municipality has inflicted a constitutional injury." Gibson v.
County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 2002). First, where the
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inspection are, in all but the smallest municipalities, likely to be made
by a lower or mid-level prosecutor who is not the official policyrnaker
for the municipal defendant. With that individual officer dismissed
from the suit and there being no link between him and the official
policymaker for the municipality, there are simply no defendants to
sue.
Here the novelty of the claim comes to hurt the plaintiff once
again. Apart from the dearth of reported decisions available to defeat
a qualified immunity defense, the lack ofcase law makes it less likely
that the municipality will have developed a department-wide policy
on point. Similarly, proving custom will be difficult since there is
unlikely to be a custom or practice so widespread that the official
policymaker is expected to be on notice of it and assumed to have
ratified it by allowing it to continue.52 Recognized theories of liability
based an official policy like the failure to properly train 3 or like the
defendant municipality itself (or through its official policymaker) violates the
Constitution or directed its employees to do so, no causal analysis is needed.
Brown, 520 U.S. at 404-05, 117 S. Ct. at 1388.
To show that the municipality violated someone's rights or instructed its
employees to do so, a plaintiff can prove that the municipality acted with
'the state of mind required to prove the underlying violation,' just as a
plaintiff does when he or she alleges that a natural person has violated his
rights.
Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1185 (citation omitted).
Second, where the defendant municipality is called to answer for the
constitutional violations of third parties (including their non-policymaking
employees), it is necessary to show an affirmative decision that permits a finding
that the defendant municipality is the cause of the constitutional violation. Bd. of
County Commissioners,520 U.S. at 405, 117 S. Ct. at 1388; Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. at 387-89, 109 S. Ct. 1204-05. The standard by which this conduct is
measured is deliberate indifference as the passages cited by the appellate court
describe. Bd. of County Commissioners,520 U.S. at 404, 414-15, 117 S. Ct. at
1388, 1393. However, Justice O'Connor emphasizes that the decisions which
"cause" the third parties' constitutional violation are otherwise ordinarily "legal"
and permissible. Bd.of County Commissioners,Id.at 405, 117 S. Ct. at 1389. That
is, "a plaintiff can [show] that through its omissionsthe municipality is responsible
for a constitutional violation committed by one ofits employees, even though the
municipality's policies were facially constitutional, the municipality did not direct
the employee to take the unconstitutional action, and the municipality did not have
the state of mind required to prove the underlying violation." Gibson, 290 F.3d at
1186 (citing Canton, 489 U.S. at 387-89, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1204). The
municipality's liability does not rest on breach of a duty but arises because it
"causes" a constitutional violation which the official policymaker knew or should
have known and "deliberately" disregarded.
52. A custom or practice can establish official policy only if it is so widespread
that it can be said to have the force oflaw. See Bd. of County Commissioners,520
U.S. at 403-04, 117 S. Ct. at 1388; Monell,436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S. Ct. at 2036;
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68, 90 S. Ct. at 1613.
53. Canton, 489 U.S. 278, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (failure to train is established if it
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hiring ofincompetent prosecutors54 would fail on the same ground, since
one cannot train for something novel norjudge prosecutor candidates on
how they will handle policy questions that have never come up.
If the plaintiff is lucky enough to be suing a small enough
prosecutor's office or one where the official policymaker made the
decision in question herself, the plaintiff would still have to overcome
the Court's restrictive precedent on how to judge single decisions by
official policymakers which cause harm. Under Board of County
Comm 'rsv. Brown," the attorney would have to be prepared to show
that in making the decision, the official policymaker was deliberately
indifferent to the foreseeable constitutional violations that the plaintiff
would suffer.56 For our attorney, this state of mind requirement would
prove difficult to meet. The defendant policymaker would likely claim
that he was convinced by the weight ofthe evidence at trial and the fact
that the conviction was uniformly upheld, that access to the evidence was
pointless. That is, even assuming that the plaintiff had a right to the
evidence, it might be possible for the defendant to argue that the
violation of those rights did not seem to him to cause any harm, in which
case he would arguably not have been deliberately indifferent to those
rights. While our attorney might be able to fend off this argument by
reference to medical treatment cases in prison,57 this would prove to be
a difficult argument in any case-and one likely litigated at the summary
judgment stage with the benefit of minimal discovery conducted only
after individual immunity claims were resolved.
If these troubles were not enough, the assumptions of the
hypothetical obscure several others. Just how the constitutional violation
is framed is a matter of some consequence. The court's injunction in
Grahamv. Conner,58 that plaintiffs must rely on the narrowest ground for
recovery, seems to exclude substantive due process bases for recovery.59
amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights ofthe people with whom the police
come in contact).
54. A single hiring decision might be recoverable if it is itself unconstitutional
or, more likely, ifit can be said to have caused a constitutional violation to which
the official policy maker was deliberately indifferent. See Bd. of County
Commissioners, 520 U.S. at 405, 117 S. Ct. at 1389.

55.
56.
57.
58.

520 U.S. 397, 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997).
Id. at 404-05, 117 S.Ct. 1388-89.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S. Ct. 285 (1976).
490 U.S. 386, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).

59. Substantive due process would be violated, in any case, by only the most
egregious official conduct. In cases involving quick decisions, at least, this means
behavior which "shocks the conscience." City of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998). See also, S.S. v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960, 964 (8th
Cir. 2000) (en banc). Several Circuit Courts have refused to extend the "shocks the
conscience" test to decisions made with the benefit of reflection, applying instead
"deliberate indifference" tojudge illegal behavior. See Khan v. Gallitano, 180 F.3d
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Similarly, restrictions on procedural due process seem to suggest that
state tort remedies might be sufficient process (even ifthose remedies are
unavailable in fact).' Also, the temptation to allege discrimination in the
decision to deny access is burdened by the strict proof ofintent required
to establish a violationd6 ' which is further hampered by limitations on
discovery at the preliminary stages. That is, stating a claim requires the
presence of public or notorious statements supporting discriminator2,
intent, or similarly inflammatory evidence obtained prior to discovery.
Just how the prisoner finally obtained the evidence for testing is
likely to also affect the chances ofhis claim. Ifhe obtained access to the
evidence through litigation, it is likely that he will have been forced to
sign a release/dismissal agreement as settlement ofthe demand for access
to the evidence. These agreements might limit recovery.63 The Supreme
Court's focus injudging the validity ofrelease/dismissal agreements has
been "voluntariness."64 This focus would seem to take our hypothetical
outside that jurisprudence. After all, how voluntary is an innocent
person's decision to waive his claims against a person denying him
access to the only instrument ofhis freedom-as a condition for access
to that means ofproving his innocence? In any case, a release/dismissal
agreement could prove detrimental to his litigation in other ways. For
example, the agreement, signed by a prisoner who was advised by
competent counsel, might be employed in support of an argument that
the issues in question were res judicata.
829,836 (7th Cir. 1999); Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro Police Dept., 159 F.3d 365,
373 (9th Cir. 1998); Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 1998).
60. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (1984) (postdeprivation remedies adequate in intentional harm case). But see Zinermon v.
Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990). See also Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d
967, 972-73 (5th Cir. 1983) (prosecutors' coverup of colleagues murder of
plaintiff's daughter deprived them of property - the civil cause of action - without
due process of law).
61. Seeespecially,Personnel Adm'rofMassachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
258, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2285 (1979) ("'Discriminatory purpose,' [however], implies
more than intent as volition or intent as awareness ofconsequences. [I]t implies that
the decision maker... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least
in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group."); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2048 (1976)
("The essential element ...is purpose or intent...").
62. See my articulation of a similar argument in the context of employment
discrimination cases. John Valery White, The IrrationalTurn in Employment
DiscriminationLaw: Slouching Toward a UnifiedApproach to CivilRights Law,
53 Mercer L. Rev. 709, 758-83 (2002).
63. See Newtonv. Rumery, 480U.S. 386, 393, 107 S. Ct. 1187, 1192 (1987).
64. Id. at 392, 107 S.Ct. at 1192.
65. This was precisely the decision of the federal district court in the case on
which the author worked. See Charles v. Greenberg, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13665
(E.D. La. 2001) (case dismissed as res judicata on basis of plaintiff's release).
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On top of all of this, the plaintiff needs to negotiate the myriad
extra-statutory limitations that might bar recovery. Justiciability
requirements," limitations on injunctive recovery, and application
of borrowed state limitations on recovery 68 all raise the stakes of
civil rights litigation, stakes compounded by the likes of Rule
68-which makes rejection of even offensively low settlement
proposals risky given the prospect of losing on any ofthe foregoing
grounds and having to pay the defendant's costs.69 Our attorney will
have to master each of these doctrines and fend off the waves of
motions seeking to defeat his client's recovery. What looked
promising, even fabulously so, now seems daunting and morose. Is
this what civil rights law was supposed to be?
II. A DIALECTIC TALE OF THE DEMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

Does all of this mean that civil rights law is dead? To the extent
that civil rights law reflected the promise of Brown v. Board of
Education7° -that civil rights law would provide a mechanism to
promote social change and bring bureaucratic behavior in line with
public values" t -the answer is yes. Brown 's structural reform
66. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984)
(articulating test of standing to include injury in fact, causal nexus, and
redressability).
67. See especially,Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983)
(barring injunctive relief where plaintiffs cannot show they will be subject to illegal
practice in future); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 94 S. Ct. 669 (1974) (barring
attack on widespread illegal practices as based on assumption of future illegal
activity by plaintiff).
68. See, e.g., Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 98 S. Ct. 1991 (1978)
(borrowing restrictive Louisiana wrongful death and survival statutes to determine
the survivability of § 1983 claim).
69. See, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985). See also
Davies, supranote 24, at 220-21, 223-25 (1997).
70. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686
(1954); Brown v. Bd. ofEduc. of Topeka (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 75 S. Ct. 753
(1955).
71. This is, of course, a reference to "structural reform" or "institutional"
litigation. "Institutional litigation, while not precisely definable, typically requires
the courts to scrutinize the operation of large public institutions. The suits are
generally brought by persons subject to the control of the institutions who seek as
relief some relatively elaborate rearrangement of the institution's mode of
operation." Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinaryand the
Extraordinaryin InstitutionalLitigation, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 465, 467-68 (1980).
Structural litigation's purpose, according to Professor Schuck
is to alter broad social conditions by reforming the internal structural
relationships ofgovernment agencies or public institutions. Instrumentally,
it operates through the forward-looking, mandatory injunction but assumes
a relatively intrusive form, a more or less detailed order whose
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implications72 were perhaps abandoned in substantive terms by
Roe;73 in institutional terms it was supplemented by Monroe v.
prescriptions displace significant areas of defendants' discretion. It relies
upon a rather fluid, group-oriented party structure and often demands an
active, administrative role for the judge. It usually finds its justification in
the more open-ended constitutional provisions, such as the equal
protection or due process clauses. Its issuance often precipitates an
extremely protracted process typically including judicial wheedling,
spasmodic negotiation, and bureaucratic resistance.
Peter Schuck, Suing Government: Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs 151
(1983). The cases implicated are typified by the sunumary Eisenberg and Yeazell
give one mental institution case: "Wyatt v. Stickney [325 F. Supp 781 (M.D. Ala.),
hearing on standards ordered, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344
F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974)] deserves paradigmatic status, for
it has all the elements of a dramatic set piece: wretched mental patients, a steelyeyed judge of national prominence, a recalcitrant state bureaucracy, and a new
constitutional right." Eisenberg and Yeazell, supra note 71. On structural reform
as litigation model, see also Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93
Harv. L. Rev. 1(1979); Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 376
(1982). See contraAbram Chayes, The Role oftheJudge in PublicLawLitigation,
89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976); Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse,
126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 715, 716 (1978).
72. Brown II's affirmative obligation to desegregate schools represented one
institutional mandate; Greene v. County SchoolBd. ofNew Kent County, 391 U.S.
430, 88 S. Ct. 1689 (1968) and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg,402 U.S. 1, 91
S. Ct. 1267 (1971) represent another. The former placed on all governmental units
an affirmative obligation to eliminate dual school systems. Brown II, 349 U.S. at
300, 301, 75 S. Ct. at 756, 757 (requiring "prompt and reasonable start toward full
compliance" in order to achieve public schools of racially nondiscriminatory
character "with all deliberate speed"). The latter, perhaps supplanting the former,
focused on districts shown to be engaged in continuing segregation. See Green, 391
U.S. at 438, 88 S. Ct. at 1694 ("deliberate perpetuation ofthe unconstitutional dual
system can only have compounded the harm of such a system. Such delays are no
longer tolerable"); Swann, 403 U.S. at 24, 91 S. Ct. at 1280. (District Court's
"express finding... that a dual school system had been maintained by the school
authorities at least until 1969" is a basis for key remedial order). That is, the latter
requires a proof of, basically, discrimination. While both triggered an obligation
to eliminate all vestiges of segregation, whether current segregation or the current
effects ofpast segregation, only the former is self executing. So, by the 1970s, the
Supreme Court can be said to have transformed a presumption of segregation into
a presumption of compliance with the Constitution which required proof of a
constitutional violation to trigger the affirmative obligation. In both cases, the goal
is to transform institutions rather than to remedy individual injury.
73. 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973). I have written elsewhere:
Roe, as Professor Fiss indicates, is not concerned with the institutional
character ofrights deprivations: "[o]ver the last twenty years, Roe v. Wade
has replaced Brown v. Bd. ofEduc. as the central organizing precedent of
our jurisprudence, and it has commonly been taken to affirm the value of
individual autonomy." Institutions, the intermediary apparatus of the state,
are less than an essential component ofRoe's construction of privacy and
abortion. The focus is on individual's prerogatives, ensured by the
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Pape.74 But the individual rights conceived in Roe and made
compensable by Monroe'sreading of § 1983 have themselves been
subject to revision. Today civil rights law seems more a system of
equitable remedies for extreme and outrageous governmental action.
Neither structural change nor compensation for violations of civil
liberties is assured. Judicial discretion, not rights, characterizes this
system. Extreme abuses ofpower, not violations of constitutional
values, are its triggers.75
This transformation is the product of a dialectical process
shifting from a focus on institutional reform to individual liability
and recovery and back. This process has spiraled toward narrower
recovery as problems in each vision of recovery has prompted a
move to an ever narrower vision of the other.
After years of engaging Jim Crow only arbitrarily,7 6 it can be said
that the Court took a great leap in Brown v. Board of Education,
deciding in Brown 11 that conformity with public values implicit in
the Constitution required broad structural change.77 Given the
Constitution and violated by the state.
Roe andBrown's significance as organizing precedents derive from what
they say about citizens' relations with the state. Roe tells of inviolable
human rights and a state whose power derives froman agreement to preserve
the inviolable-that agreement sometimes understood as advancing the
public good. Brown shares this origin in natural rights rhetoric, but tells
fundamentally of a responsibility of government to advance important
"public values." Brown's "public values" relate to and incorporate natural
rights, but, unlike Roe, fulfill a larger role.
See John Valery White, VindicatingRights, supranote 25, at 208 (quoting Owen
M. Fiss, The Allure ofIndividualism, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 965, 974 (1993)).
74. Monroe created a ready remedial route for the vindication of rights by
loosening the restrictive post-Reconstruction understanding of "under color oflaw."
While Monroe only supplemented Brown, its focus, unlike Brown, is on individual
litigation. This focus is emphasized by Monroe'srejection of institutional liability.
Monroe,365 U.S. at 187-92,81 S. Ct. at 484-87. Thus, unlike Brown, which ignores
individual remedies and focuses on institutional responsibility, Monroe focuses on
individual remedies from individually responsible actors. This formulation is changed
by Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of City ofNew York, 436 U.S. 658, 663, 98 S. Ct.
2018, 2022 (1978), which extends liability to municipal corporations, but rejects
respondeat superior liability - i.e., true institutional responsibility.
75. Accord White, IrrationalTurn, supranote 62.
76. The Court did engage Jim Crow occasionally but, typically, as in the
Scottsboro Boys Cases, see Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579 (1935)
(overruling conviction based on factual determinations because of exclusion ofblack
jurors frompool) and Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600, 606-07, 55 S. Ct. 575, 578
(1935) (reversing state conviction despite adequate and independent state law
grounds), only in the context of great fanfare or outrage, and then in a way that treated
Jim Crow's outrages as reprehensible but isolated departures from acceptable
behavior. Seegenerally,Dan T. Carter, Scottsboro: A Tragedy ofthe American South
(1969); James Goodman, Stories of Scottsboro (1994).
77. Brown It says:
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enormity of the charge to state actors, it is not surprising that the
Court left it to them to develop means of achieving change.
Five years after Brown II the Court, which that same term had
begun with Mapp v. Ohio'8 to protect civil liberties in criminal
prosecutions, expanded the avenues for enforcing civil liberties in
Monroe v. Pape. Monroe represented a substantial change, perhaps
even a departure, from Brown. In Monroe the Court envisioned
protection of rights that did not implicate institutional change but
rather individual liability. That this represented at least a tacit
departure from Brown is seen in the Court's rejection of municipal
liability.79 Enforcement of public values was subordinated to
protection of individual rights. Deterrence was assumed to occur in
Monroe on an individual basis.
But Brown I1s approach was in no way squelched by Monroe.
Rather it was transformed from an assumption that states' behavior
was out of line with constitutional principle to a system where the
proof of specific unconstitutionality was necessary to trigger a
remedial response. In Swann the Court focuses on the District
Court's finding that the defendant school district had continued to
operate a dual system of schools.80 The abandonment of formal
segregation was not enough to comply with the Constitution if
intentional segregation was evidenced.' But the quiet change was
Full implementation of [the constitutional principles articulated in
Brown 1] may require solution of varied local school problems ....
Accordingly, we believe it appropriate to remand the cases to those
[district courts which originally heard them].
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by
equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a
practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting
and reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise
of these traditional attributes of equity power ....Courts of equity may
properly take into account the public interest in the elimination of [any]
obstacles in a systematic and effective manner. But it should go without
saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed
to yield simply because of disagreement with them.
Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299-300, 75 S. Ct. at 756.
78. 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961).
79. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187-92, 81 S.Ct. at 484-87.
80. Swann, 402 U.S. at 24,91 S. Ct. at 1280 (District Court's "express finding
...
that a dual school system had been maintained by the school authorities at least
until 1969" is basis for key remedial order).
81. In its discussion of "Racial Balances or Racial Quotas," the Swann Court
first rejects the legality of any fixed quotas in student assignments or otherwise.
Swann, 402 U.S. at 22-24, 91 S. Ct. at 1279-80. But, the Court goes on to say that,
"As the voluminous record in this case shows, the predicate for the Discrict Court's
use of the 710/o-29% ratio was twofold: first, its express finding. ...that a dual
system had been maintained by the school authorities at least until 1969; second, its
fiding... that the school board had totally defaulted in its acknowledged duty to
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that now intentional segregation would have to be shown and that this
was the trigger for the affirmative duties. Despite this perhaps
narrowing aspect of Swann, it emphasized, along with cases like it,
the tremendous power the Court was willing to allow District Court
judges in order to achieve compliance with public values. As
summarized by defenders of structural reform litigation, 2 this
approach was aimed at the big bureaucratic institutions which blindly
violated rights. In something of a last gasp, this approach could be
said to have prompted the court to extend Monroe to municipalities
in Monell v. Dept. of Social Services.8 3 But even as the Court
envisioned municipal liability creating incentives for government
units to eliminate rights violating behavior, it shied away from
vicarious liability," thus undercutting any such effects.
Resistance to structural reforms of the type envisioned in
desegregation orders, especially Swann'ssupport for busing, triggered
another shift toward individual rights. This shift, like previous ones,
was informed by the concerns which triggered it. The move to
individual rights conceptions of civil rights law was offered as an
antidote to courts' increased involvement in everyday affairs of
government bodies.85 That is, civil rights cases should be thought of
come forward with an acceptable plan .... ." Id. This division of failures is
revealing. The failure of the duty is a failure to construct a plan, not a failure to
comply with Brown. Instead, the first finding is the trigger based on illegal
behavior, which is defined as "maintaining" a dual system. This distinction subtly
changes the focus from Brown's ongoing duty to the specific actions of the
defendant school board. This view would be memorialized in Milliken v. Bradley's
limitation of the reach ofdesegregation equitable powers, Milliken v. Bradley (I),
418 U.S. 717, 91 S.Ct. 3112 (1974), despite the Court's efforts to limit the
implications of its Milliken decision on Brown 's affirmative duty. See Columbus
Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 99 S.Ct. 2941 (1979) (school boards have
a continuing, affirmative duty to desegregate if they were operating under system
of de jure segregation when Brown was decided); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 99 S.Ct. 2971 (1979) (same).
82. See authorities cited supranote 71.

83. 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978).
84. Id. at 691-95, 98 S. Ct. at 2036-38.
85. See Robert F. Nagel, Controllingthe StructuralInjunction, 7 Harv.J.L. &
Pub. Pol'y 395 (1984). Professor Nagel noted that as of 1984 more than 600 school
districts, prisons in thirty states, and some 270 local jails were subject to federal
judicial supervision, id. at 396, a circumstance which, "[a]t present the Supreme
Court is either unwilling or unable to provide any effective restraint on the
intrusions of the federal judiciary into state and local government." Id. at 396-97
(footnote omitted). Characteristic of critics of structural injunctions, Nagel's
critique notes that the remedies provided rarely benefit the original plaintiffs. See
id. at 402 (noting that desegregation remedies do not place victims in the position
the victims would have "enjoyed but for" the violation; often victims have grown
up by the time the remedy is implemented). In a celebrated essay Professor Fuller
expressed concern over the inability of courts to handle "polycentric" tasks, that is,
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as constitutional torts and rights conceived, as in Roe v. Wade, as6
protections of individual autonomy. Structural reform is dead.
Cross jurisdictional remedies in school desegregation cases are
rejected. 7 Disparate impact and pattern and practice proofs are
subordinated to disparate treatment proofs88 and subjected to severe
versions ofthat proofrequirement.8 9 And disparate impact proofs are
rejected in equal protection cases. 9
By 1978 it can be said that the second reconstruction had drawn
to an end. Indeed, where Brown 's injunction to dismantle dual
educational systems ran into conflict with individual rights, it was
Brown that was abandoned. 9' This new individualist focus recast the
key question of the post-structural reform age. While judges
supplanting elected officers was no longer the severe problem it was
predicted to become, it lived on in the new question: where was the
'
line between civil rights and "mere torts?"92
This reformulated
question broadened the inquiry that was supposedly focused on
individual rights. Rather the concern became again structural, but
with the limitations of the new focus.
those restructurings which may affect parties difficult to foresee, and he questioned
whether judges should engage in this process at all. Lon L. Fuller, The Formsand
Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 394-404 (1978); see also D.

Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy 33-56 (1977) (discussing attributes of
adjudication and arguing that "courts have very limited ability to monitor and
control unintended consequences"); John Leubsdorf,Remediesfor Uncertainty,61
B.U. L. Rev. 132, 138 (1981) (discussing court's "inability to perceive the
consequences of its measures and the details of its goals"); Note, Implementation
Problemsin InstitutionalReform Litigation,91 Harv. L. Rev. 428, 432-35 & n.21

(1977) (discussing organization theory and institutional reform).
Abram Chayes' mild criticism of the structural reform approach, for example,
posits two models of adjudication: the traditional one, an overly narrow focus on
private dispute resolution between individuals, see Chayes, supra note 71, at
1282-83, and a public law model, which departs drastically from that model. See
id. at 1283. Chayes' critique has been taken as the structure for more
thoroughgoing attacks on the propriety of the structural reform approach. Also
mildly criticizing structural injunctions, Peter Schuck concludes that, while reviews
of structural reforms are mostly negative, "[i]n truth... the success of structural
injunctions in implementing substantive rights probably cannot accurately be
assessed." P. Schuck, supranote 71, at 154-55.
86. In the prison context, for example, structural injunctions are expressly
forbidden by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-140, 110 Stat.
1321-70 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a)).
87. Milliken v. Bradley (I), 433 U.S. 267, 97 S.Ct. 2749 (1977).
88.

See White, IrrationalTurn, supranote 62, at 728-29.

89. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 97 S. Ct. 2736
(1977); Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 109 S.Ct. 2115 (1989);
Civil Rights Act of 1991.
90. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040 (1976).
91. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 476 U.S. 267, 106 S.Ct. 1842 (1986).
92. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155 (1976).

636

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63

Consequently individual immunities were expanded at the cost of
individual recovery to ensure that government actors could act
without worry of litigation.93 Restrictions on official policy and
custom suits (especially failure to train suits) were imposed in order
to enforce Monell's rejection of vicarious liability and to save the
public fisc from exposure.94 Substantial limits on constitutional rights
were imposed to further restrict civil rights litigation." Prison abuse
was to be judged by the restrictive deliberate indifference test,9 6 and
abuses occurring during emergencies subject to the even more
restrictive criminal malice test.97 Substantive due process claims were
subjected to standards of proof quite similar to Eighth Amendment
cases. 98 Procedural due process was said to be satisfied by postdeprivation remedies, transforming erstwhile due process cases into
state tort claims. 99 Claims missed by this restriction were further
culled by the exclusion of negligent takings from procedural due
process.
While the restrictive spirit continued into the 1990s, a new
repudiation of the individualist model emerged.
This final
abandonment ofthe individual rights model was most clearly evident
in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996.11 Prison litigation had
been the model which structural reformers raised to prove the
advantages of structural litigation. They noted that the closed
institutional context ofa prison was a poor place for individual rights
litigation. The demise of the structural reform was in part a
repudiation of their view of prison reform litigation. Critics of
structural reform argued that it put courts in inappropriate control
over the running of day to day affairs of prisons and advocated for
individual suits. By the 1990s these same critics were criticizing
individual suits as unwieldy. 2 The PLRA shifts away from
93. See supracases discussed in notes 36-44.
94. See supracases discussed in notes 50-56.
95. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537-42, 101 S. Ct. 1908,
1914-16 (1981) (post-deprivation remedies satisfy due process requirements for
negligent deprivation ofproperty), overruledin partby, Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986) (negligent acts do not constitute deprivation for due
process purposes). See also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S. Ct. 668
(1986).
96. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) (deliberate
indifference judged by test used for criminal liability).
97. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S. Ct. 1078 (1986).
98. Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998).
99. Parratt,451 at 537-42, 101 S. Ct. at 1914-16 (1981).
100. Daniels,474 U.S. 327, 106 S. Ct. 662.
101. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-140, 110 Stat. 1321-70
(1996).
102. See discussion in Joseph T. Lukens, The PrisonLitigationReform Act:
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individual suits but replaces it with a system of administrative
reviews that make reform of prison administration a practical
impossibility. Lest this move be mistaken for support for structural
litigation, the PLRA also includes severe limits on courts' equitable
powers. Indeed, it goes so far as ending many of the existing
supervisory injunctions still in effect when the act was passed.
Restrictions similar to the PLRA can be found in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and is found in the
numerous anti-terrorism reforms that have followed the September 11
attacks. On the whole these reforms can be seen as themselves
repudiating the individual rights model which itself repudiated the
structural reform one. The question of this symposium is whether
these changes constitute the complete demise ofcivil rights law, but
first a few words on what these changes have amounted to.
III. WHAT DOES IT MEAN? THE PARADOX OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

The paradox of civil rights law is that these myriad shifts in
emphasis have occurred without a serious, overt repudiation of civil
rights law itself.0 3 That is, opponents of civil rights law no longer
attack the notion of rights; they want rights to protect their interests.
Courts restricting civil rights litigation are not repudiating civil rights
as an ideal; they are refocusing civil rights law as a means of
Three Strikes and You're Out of Court - It May be Effective, but is it
Constitutional?,70 Temp. L. Rev. 471, 490-97, 482-90 (1997) (discussing the
"flood" of prisoner litigation and frivolous suits charges). See also Eastman,
Drainingthe Swamp: An Examination of Judicialand CongressionalPolicies
Designedto Limit PrisonerLitigation,20 Col. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 61 (1988); Gail
L. Bakaitis DeWolf, Protectingthe Courtsfrom the BarrageofFrivolousPrisoner
Litigation:A Look atJudicialRemedies and Ohio'sProposedLegislativeRemedy,
57 Ohio St. L.J. 257, 261 (1996) (arguing that at least 97% of prisoner cases are
frivolous).
103.
[N]either the newly shrunken circumference ofthese important predicate
constitutional rights nor the "clearly established" approach to individual
immunity represents a broad-spectrum restriction on the scope of§ 1983
itself. Instead, the doctrinal accretions simply reduce the plaintiff's

chances of success in stating a claim ....

[T]he qualified immunity

decisions, Harlow, and Creighton v. Anderson, while they doom all
constitutional claims against individual defendants when the right
asserted was not judicially articulated with clarity at the time of the
challenged conduct, do not by themselves increase the plaintiff's prima
facie burden under § 1983. Nevertheless, the combination of sharply
curtailed predicate protections and the greatly expanded qualified
immunity defense does as a practical matter significantly disable § 1983
individual-defendant litigation from pushing the frontiers of federally
protected rights.
Harold S. Lewis, Jr, and Elizabeth J. Norman, Civil Rights Law and Practice 233

(2001).
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protecting property and privilege. In this light, there is something
strange about the topic ofthis symposium. Some might even say it
is strained and overly dramatic to even ask if civil rights law is
"dead."'' "° On the whole I nevertheless think civil rights law is dead.
So how do I explain the paradox that there remains a panoply of
statutory causes of action to enforce numerous rights? The resolution
to this paradox of civil rights law is that civil rights law is no longer
has been transformed into something akin to traditional
law, but
05
equity.1
104. Professor Julie Davis' comments, admittedly a bit dated today, are
characteristic of the optimistic view of civil rights law.
...data exist that seem to indicate civil rights litigation is exploding.
Private employment discrimination claims, as measured by filings in all
federal courts, have greatly increased from 344 in 1970 to 15,965 in 1994.
Similarly, the number of prisoner claims filed has greatly increased-the
vast majority being pro se-notwithstanding the low success rate of
prisoner litigation. Eisenberg's most recent calculations show an increase
in the numbers of general civil rights filings in the 1990s to over 35% of
the federal docket in 1994. One could look at the numerical data and
conclude that private enforcement ofcivil rights legislation had never been
better. Some might even conclude that civil rights legislation is too
successful.
Davis, supranote 24, at 203-04 (citations omitted). This data predates the Prison
Litigation Reform Act. Nevertheless, there remains a large number ofprisoner civil
rights filings. There were 13,523 prisoner civil rights filings (exclusive ofprison
conditions filings, another 9,987) in the federal district courts in the 12 month
period ending March 31, 2002. See Federal Judicial Case Load Statistics, March
31, 2003, Table C-2, Office ofHuman Resources and Statistics, Statistics Division,
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. There were 40,549 civil rights
cases commenced during this period exclusive ofprisoner suits. Id. These included
21,117 employment civil rights cases. Id.
105. "Equity is the branch of law which... was applied and administered by the
Court of Chancery ....A litigant asserting some equitable right or remedy must
show that his claim has 'an ancestry found in history and in the practice and
precedents of the court administering equityjurisdiction." Jill E. Martin, Hanbury
and Martin's Modem Equity 3 (16th ed., 2001). The rules of equity, are often
described by reference to maxims of equity, a dozen ofwhich are listed in Hanbury
andMartin.Id. at 27-31. They are:
1. Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy,
2. Equity follows the law,
3. He who seeks equity must do equity,
4. He who comes to equity must come with clean hands,
5. Where the equities are equal the law prevails,
6. Where the equities are equal the first in time prevails,
7. Equity imputes an intention to fulfill an obligation,
8. Equity regards as done that which ought be done,
9. Equity is equality,
10. Equity looks to the intent rather than the form,
11. Delay defeats equities, and
12. Equity acts in personam.
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I have argued elsewhere that disparate treatment cases in
employment discrimination law have been transformed into equity,"
and I believe the same transformation can be identified in civil rights
law generally. 7 This is not the place to describe this transformation
in detail, but I believe it is evidenced in several substantive factors.
First, severe limitations have been placed on substantive constitutional
rights, restricting violations to cases where state actors have engaged in
utterly outrageous behavior. Second, the individual's liability will be
excluded in all new cases by the court's robust view of individual
immunities. Third, the defendant's municipal employer will be
shielded from liability unless it participated in the decision, or knew of
its risk and, basically, outrageously ignored it by refusing to train its
officers or by making other decisions in the face of the known risks.
More significantly, perhaps, these limitations vest in judges
tremendous power. This is an ironic charge, since the main criticism
of traditional civil rights law has been that it vested judges with too
much power. However, this irony is, I believe, only proof of the
paradox of civil rights law: federal judges in civil rights cases have
never been more powerful. Only the tremendous discretion given them
is understood to be used primarily if not exclusively to throttle social
change through the law. In any case, the transformation ofcivil rights
Id. These values, while offering remedies outside "the law" clearly subordinate the
system of equity to legal principles (as overtly suggested by number two). They can
be summarized as a system that offers a) extraordinary relief, b) to deserved
petitioners, c) where the law fails to help but does not prohibit, and on the basis of
bad acts-intentional, inequitable behavior.
The vision of civil rights law as "equity" is both obvious and strained. It is
obvious in the sense that the courts have long relied on the equitable powers of the
courts as the basis for crafting flexible remedies. See, e.g., Brown II, 349 U.S. at
300, 73 S. Ct. at 756. Abram Chayes even describes modem public law as "the
triumph of equity." Chayes, supra note 71, at 1292 ("One of the most striking
procedural developments of this century is the increasing importance of equitable
relief.... the old sense ofequitable remedies as 'extraordinary' has faded"). It is
strained, though, in that civil rights plaintiffs have not been asked to appeal to the
conscious of the court for remedy, but go to court armed with individual rights
established under no less a font of law than the Constitution itself. However, it can
be said that the shifts in civil rights law that allow relief only when there exist
outrages, treat those hallowed rights as mere rites, conceiving only of state law as
law, per se. In this way the "Maxims of Equity" resonate.
106. White, IrrationalTurn, supranote 62, at 709.
107. In disparate treatment cases,
The Supreme Court's employment discrimination jurisprudence can be
understood as coherent only by seeing it as a effort to unify allof civil rights
law under a single approach. That is, the "discrimination" to which the
Court's tests refer is best understood as an "outrageous act"-- a decision akin
to, but more conscious than deliberate indifference. In the Courts substantive
due process jurisprudence, this standard is designated the "shocks the
conscience" standard.
White, IrrationalTurn, supra note 62, at 755.
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law into equity has been accomplished by erecting numerous judgment
questions which judges must assess if a case is to ever proceed to
decision. At every stage of the litigation civil rights plaintiffs are
required to re-litigate the basic question in dispute. And, at no point in
the litigation does their success on one aspect of the claim have
estoppel effect on any ofthe other questions pertinent to the litigation.
In fact the law is littered with rachet-like doctrines that bind the
plaintiff if he loses, but leave an unsuccessful defendant to relitigate
basically the same substantive question under a different doctrine. 8
Even the most rudimentary claim is made expensive and complicated.
But behind this, all the questions in civil rights cases have been
transformed into the unseemly quest to convince the judge that what
took place, what happened to your client was the most outrageous thing
ever. Few cases can bear the weight ofthis proof. Consequently, civil
rights cases have come to turn as much on pretrial publicity as on the
merits of the claim. Law is surrendered to tabloid-like publicity, and
the rights of citizens are sacrificed to the whims of men and women
sitting in judgment.
IV. THE SYMPOSIUM'S TAKE ON THE QUESTIONS
Well, is civil rights law dead? The question implies that there has
been a departure from the seminal Brown v. Bd. of Education
decision, raising the need to assess the nature ofthe fifty-odd years of
jurisprudence since Brown. It demands reflection on the complex of
social phenomena with which civil rights law interacts. And, it
requires examination of the promise that civil rights law could
transform the relationships of citizens to power. Indeed, civil rights
108. In Saucier,Justice Kennedy emphasized that "In a suit against an officer
for an alleged violation of a constitutional policy, the requisites of a qualified
immunity defense must be considered in proper sequence." Saucier,533 U.S. at
200, 121 S. Ct. at 2155. Because qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand
trial, the court must consider "in the light most favorable to the party asserting the
injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional
right? This must be the initial inquiry." Id. at 201, 121 S. Ct. at 2156.
Consequently, the plaintiff will be forced to argue his substantive constitutional
claim on the pleadings, usually with no discovery. Ifhe loses, his case is lost. For
Kennedy, "This is the process for the law's elaboration from case to case," id. at
201, on the pleadings. Should the plaintiff overcome this hurdle, this finding has
no binding effect on the defendant who is free to argue that the right is insufficiently
precise to be applied to the case at bar, id.at 201-02, challenge whether this right
was clearly established at the time of the events in question, id.at 202, or move for
summary judgment on the precise legal issue later in the proceedings. In many
instances, such as in Saucier,the substantive constitutional issue in question in the
case will mirror the question ofwhether a reasonable officer would have known the
act to be unconstitutional. In those cases, should the plaintiff survive so far, he will
be charged with relitigating that issue yet again.
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law boldly pledges to facilitate equality, dignity, and justice, but it is
today unclear it can (or perhaps ever could) really deliver. Over the
last several decades, efforts to reconcile the transformative promise
of civil rights law with pre-existing commitments to notions like
federalism seem to have left standing little of the original ideals
associated with the term civil rights. Whether this constitutes the
complete demise of the civil rights regime was vigorously debated at
this symposium.
A diverse group ofcivil rights scholars 9 was assembled by the
LouisianaLaw Review at the Lod Cook Conference Center on the
Louisiana State University campus in March of 2003. The group sat
around a table for two days to engage these issues in a classic
symposium format. Collectively, the group was optimistic about the
future ofcivil rights law, though everyone recognized that the severe
doctrinal limitations imposed in recent years have had a devastating
and foreboding effect on the field. The participants presented papers
and responses and engaged in open discussion of numerous civil
rights-related topics. The paper's presented below reflect the formal
presentations, though the papers typically transcend their author's role
as primary presenter or respondent.
The participants addressed civil rights law in its international,
comparative, national, and state dimensions. The international and
comparative foci introduced discussion of the relation ofcivil rights
law to human rights and allowed for discussion of civil rights in
contexts free of the complications of the American federal system.
The federal dimension introduced traditional civil rights issues related
to the American history ofracial apartheid and recent demographic
and social transformations in the American populace. That focus also
facilitated the symposium's engagement with structural constitutional
concerns like separation of powers and federal judicial power. The
state law focus of course interposed federalism concerns, but also
raised discussion of legal history and state practice.
The discussion was consequently wide ranging. It touched on the
relationship between broad conceptions of justice like equal
protection and human dignity, reflected on the future of affirmative
action and the role of affirmative action in civil rights law's future,
and took up the construction of race and the threats to civil rights
raised by the renewed acceptance of profiling under the rubric of
national security. Discussion ofcivil rights legal doctrine, its demise,
and possible explanations easily flowed into discussion of
109. The Symposium participants included Rhonda Magee Andrews, John M.
Devlin, Raymond T. Diamond, Tanya Hemandez, F. Michael Higginbotharn, Kevin
R. Johnson, Denise Reaume, Gregory Vincent, Robert F. Williams, Adrien
Katherine Wing, and this author.

642

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63

comparative civil rights practice, especially in states not blessed with
or burdened by a civil rights law born of a contentious civil rights
movement. In the last session, the symposium focused its exchange
on the sometimes contradictory role of state constitutional law in the
enforcement of civil rights.
Throughout, the symposium touched on substantial issues oflegal
theory. Participants examined whether locating civil rights concepts
in larger principles like human dignity could ensure that civil rights
law remained true to advancing equality and combating
subordination. Participants contemplated what remedies to inequality
and racism might remain viable today. And, much discussion was
focused on the relationship between civil rights law and advocacy,
with participants questioning whether a civil rights regime could
remain viable without coalition building, advocacy, and activism.
The symposium also raised the thorny question of the role of
precedent and adjudication in civil rights law, especially in light of
the transformations of the field in the last fifteen years. Last, the
symposium scrutinized the role of states in ensuring justice through
civil rights.
The articles of the symposium are published in the order of their
presentation at the conference. The first article is Professor Denise
Reaume's. ° examination of the role of dignity in Canadian equal
protection jurisprudence, Discrimination and Dignity."' It is
followed by Professor F. Michael Higginbotham's1 2 and Kathleen
Bergin's reflection on the current state of affirmative action, Why the
UniversityofMichiganShould Win in GrutterandGratz.' Professor
Rhonda Magee Andrews"' 4 article, Affirmative Action After Grutter:
Reflections on a TorturedDeath,Imagininga Humanity-Affirming

110. Professor of Law at the University ofToronto. Professor Reaume teaches
and writes on anti-discrimination law, language rights, and legal responses to multicultural society. See, e.g., Denise Reaume, HarmandFaultinDiscriminationLaw:
The Transitionfrom Intentionalto Adverse Effect Discrimination,2 Theoretical
Inquiries in Law 349 (2001); Denise Reaume, Individuals, Groups,and Rights to

PublicGoods, 38 U. Toronto L.J. 1 (1988). She recently delivered the Catriona
Gibson lecture at the Faculty of Law, Queen's University on "Making a Place for
Dignity in Modem Legal Thought."
111. 63 La. L. Rev. 645 (2003).
112. Professor of Law at the University ofBaltimore. Professor Higginbotham
writes on race and the law and is author of Race Law: Cases, Commentary and
Questions (2001).
113. 63 La. L. Rev. 697 (2003).
114. Associate Professor ofLaw at the University of San Francisco. Professor
Andrews teaches and writes on race relations and law. See, e.g., Rhonda Magee
Andrews, The Third Reconstruction:An Alternative to Race-Consciousnessand
Colorblindnessin Post-SlaveryAmerica, 54 Al. L. Rev. 483 (2003).
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Reincarnation"
'grew out of a response to Professor Higginbotham's
presentation but goes beyond it, invoking Canada's dignity focus in
making the case for a remedial-focused affirmative action regime.
Professor Adrien Katherine Wing's' 16 presentation concluded the first
day of the conference. Her article, Civil Rights in the Post 9-11
World: CriticalRace Praxis, CoalitionBuilding, and the War on
Terrorism'17 captures her thought-provoking examination of the
social construction of race and the other after 9-11. Her call for
coalition building as a political remedy to practices like racial
profiling is taken up by Professor Kevin R. Johnson" 8 in The Struggle
for Civil Rights: The Need for, and Impediments to, Political
CoalitionsAmong and Within Minority Groups." 9 Together the first
day's contributions examined troubles with conceiving ofan adequate
rights regime, explored the challenges to maintaining the remedial
effectiveness of civil rights law, and pointed to the need to organize
to combat assaults on rights protections.
This author' S12° ActivistInsecurityandthe Demise ofCivilRights
Law' 2' represents the beginning of the second day of the Symposium.
Professor Tanya Hemandez,122 in Comparative Judging of Civil
Rights,12' extends the author's theory about the longstanding and deep
seeded vulnerabilities of civil rights law to the context of Latin
America to ask whether it might apply differently in states without a
115. 63 La. L. Rev. 705 (2003).
116. The Bessie Dutton Murray Distinguished Professor of Law at the
University of Iowa. Professor Wing, a noted figure in the Critical Race Theory
movement, has written extensively on race, feminism, civil rights law, and
international law (focusing on women's rights and issues in the Middle East). She
has recently published, Critical Race Feminism--A Reader (2nd ed., 2003) and
Global Critical Race Feminism: An International Reader (2000).
117. 63 La. L. Rev. 717 (2003).
118. Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor ofLaw and Chicana/o
Studies at the University of California at Davis. Dean Johnson has published
extensively on international migration, immigration law and policy and civil rights,
including several books on race and identity. See, e.g., Reader on Race, Civil
Rights, and the Law: A Multicultural Approach (2001).
119. 63 La. L. Rev. 759 (2003).
120. The author is the J. Dawson Gasquet Professor of Law at Louisiana State
University. He teaches and writes on civil and human rights law. This Symposium
was inspired by his multi-part project on the Activist Insecurity, the final part of
which is his symposium contribution.
121. 63 La. L. Rev. 785 (2003).
122. Professor ofLaw and Justice Frederick Hall Scholar at Rutgers University
School of Law-Newark. Professor Hernandez teaches and writes on Race and the
Law, especially focusing on comparative race relations. See, e.g.,Tanya Kateri
Hernandez, MultiracialMatrix: The Role ofRace Ideology in the Enforcementof
AntidiscriminationLaws, A UnitedStates-LatinAmerican Comparison,87 Cornell
L. Rev. 1093 (2002).
123. 63 La. L. Rev. 875 (2003).
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contentious civil rights movement as the basis of the regime.

Professor John M. Devlin's12 4 examination of affirmative action
under the Louisiana state constitution, Louisiana Associated General
Contractors: A Case Study in the Failure of a State Equality
15
Guarantee to Furtherthe Transformative Vision of Civil Rights,
and Professor Robert F. Williams" 26 reply, Shedding Tiers "Above
andBeyond'"theFederalFloor:Loving State ConstitutionalEquality
Rights to Death in Louisiana,'27 conclude the Symposium by
reflecting on the opportunity state constitutional law presents for civil
rights enforcement and the ironic abdication by states of their
leadership role in civil rights law.

124. The William Hawk Daniels Professor ofLaw at Louisiana State University.
Professor Devlin is a state constitutional law specialist and has taught and written
on employment law. See, e.g., John Devlin, State ConstitutionalAutonomy Rights
in an Age ofFederalRetrenchment:Some Thoughts on the InterpretationofState
Rights Derivedfrom FederalSources, 3 Emerging Issues in State Const. L. 197

(1990).
125. 63 La. L. Rev. 887 (2003).
126. Distinguished Professor ofLaw at Rutgers University-Camden. Professor
Williams teaches and has written extensively on state constitutional law and
legislation, including leading casebooks in those areas. See Robert F. Williams,
State Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials (3d ed. 1999). Among his may
articles, see, e.g., Robert F. Williams, Old ConstitutionsandNew Issues:National
Lessons from Vermont's State Constitutional Case on Marriage of Same-Sex

Couples, 43 B.C. L. Rev 73 (2001).
127. 63 La. L. Rev. 917.

